The evolving landscape of African geopolitics increasingly places Türkiye and Europe at a crossroads. Back in 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu, then chief adviser to then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, famously declared, “The road to Paris passes through Africa.” This statement captured Ankara’s ambition to strengthen its ties with Africa not merely for regional influence but as a strategic gateway to bolster its relations with Europe. Today, the metaphor resonates with renewed urgency as both Türkiye and the European Union (EU) recalibrate their roles on the continent amid shifting global power balances.
Over the past decade and a half, Türkiye has transformed from a peripheral player to a formidable actor in Africa through a multidimensional approach that combines political engagement, economic investment, cultural outreach, and growing security cooperation. Ankara’s expansive strategy challenges the traditional dominance of European powers and introduces a new dynamic: a middle power rising in a region historically shaped by colonial legacies and postcolonial engagements.
Yet, this expansion has triggered mixed reactions within Europe. Some member states see Türkiye’s rise as a competitive threat undermining their established influence, while others recognize the pragmatic need to engage Ankara as a partner rather than a rival. The question remains: can Turkish-European collaboration in Africa transcend rivalry to become a genuine force for shared progress?
Türkiye’s Africa policy is deeply entwined with its quest for international recognition and middle-power status. Davutoglu’s 2009 assertion that “a country that undermines Africa cannot have an international standing” reflects Ankara’s belief that African partnerships are indispensable for its global aspirations. Unlike some European powers burdened by their colonial pasts, Türkiye frames its engagement as based on respect, sovereignty, and mutual benefit – messages that resonate strongly in many African capitals seeking alternatives to traditional partners.
However, Ankara’s growing presence is not without tension. France, in particular, remains protective of its historic and strategic interests in Africa. The recent upheavals in Niger – with the expulsion of French and US forces and the cancellation of foreign contracts – opened the door for Türkiye to step in swiftly, securing infrastructure, defense, and mining agreements, as well as supplying Bayraktar TB2 drones. For Paris, this represents a symbolic and practical encroachment on its “backyard,” underscoring the challenges of European unity in responding to Ankara’s ambitions.
Conversely, other European countries such as Italy and Germany are adopting more nuanced positions. As France’s sway declines, Italy is actively seeking to collaborate with Türkiye, recognizing complementary interests in economic development and migration management. Germany’s recalibrated Africa strategy similarly leaves room for cooperation with Ankara, especially in areas like energy security and counter-terrorism. Even Spain, focused on Mediterranean and Sahel stability, could find pragmatic reasons to partner with Türkiye.
Economic engagement is at the heart of Türkiye’s African strategy. Turkish firms are often willing to operate in challenging environments, delivering visible infrastructure projects – from roads and airports to stadiums – that European companies sometimes avoid due to risk aversion or regulatory complexities. This proactive presence opens possibilities for complementary collaboration rather than outright competition.
Moreover, existing cooperation between Turkish actors and European institutions offers a foundation to build upon. For example, Turkish scientists participate in EU-funded initiatives to address hunger in Africa, illustrating how joint efforts can produce tangible benefits. Brussels, with its financial resources and institutional weight, could amplify such partnerships by channeling support to Turkish organizations already embedded in African communities.
Security cooperation represents another critical intersection. Türkiye has become a preferred partner for several African states seeking military training, equipment, and counterterrorism assistance, including the deployment of Bayraktar drones that have changed local security dynamics. For Europe, whose interests in African stability are linked to migration, energy, and global security, engaging Ankara as an ally in these efforts could prove advantageous.
Türkiye’s diplomatic activism in Africa, especially in mediation and conflict resolution, adds a further dimension to its influence. Its ability to act as a neutral broker – unburdened by colonial history – enables Ankara to address conflicts that some EU states find difficult to approach without stirring political sensitivities. Coupled with humanitarian aid and disaster relief initiatives, Türkiye’s soft power efforts present a potential asset for European policymakers aiming to expand their impact in Africa while minimizing backlash.
Any discussion of Turkish-European collaboration in Africa must also account for China’s dominant role. Beijing’s massive infrastructure projects, financial investments, and trade partnerships have reshaped the continent’s geopolitical calculus. Europe often regards China’s engagement with suspicion, concerned about debt dependency and strategic leverage.
In this context, Türkiye’s status as an EU candidate country and NATO member positions it as a less contentious alternative partner to counterbalance China’s influence. By coordinating with Ankara, Brussels could enhance its strategic footprint without provoking the geopolitical sensitivities that direct confrontation with Beijing might entail.
Despite these opportunities, European unity remains elusive. Divergent national interests and competing visions of Africa complicate the prospects for a coherent EU approach to Turkish collaboration. France’s defensive stance contrasts sharply with the more open attitudes of Germany and Italy, highlighting the political challenges of forming a cohesive policy.
Success will require Brussels to accept a degree of flexibility: compartmentalizing areas of cooperation with Ankara, even amid broader disagreements, and focusing on pragmatic outcomes. This model has precedent in areas like migration management and trade relations, where EU member states and Türkiye have found common ground despite wider tensions.
Faruk Kaymakcı, Türkiye’s permanent delegate to the EU, captured this hopeful vision at the Brussels-Africa Hub: “The EU and EU candidate Türkiye can achieve a lot together in and for Africa, leveraging their comparative advantages.” The challenge lies in moving from rhetoric to reality.
If both sides can resist the temptation to view Africa solely as a competitive chessboard, and instead approach the continent as a region of shared opportunity and mutual interest, Turkish-European collaboration could indeed thrive. This cooperation would not only advance their geopolitical ambitions but also serve the interests of African nations seeking reliable, respectful, and diversified partnerships.
In that sense, the “road to Paris” might well pass through Africa – but only if Türkiye and Europe choose to walk it together, rather than in rivalry.