Pakistan and Bangladesh: Imagining a Lost Union

What if Pakistan and Bangladesh, once united from 1947 to 1971, were to become one again? It is a question that sparks both imagination and debate, opening possibilities about politics, economics, culture, and geopolitics in South Asia.

When Pakistan was created in 1947, it consisted of two wings—West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan) and East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh)—separated by nearly 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory. The dream of Muslim unity brought them together, but deep cultural, linguistic, and political differences eventually led to the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 after a bloody conflict. Any discussion of reunification must acknowledge both the historical wounds and the lessons of that separation.

Also Read: East Pakistan Must Return: Pakistan’s Hour of Reckoning After 54 Years

If the two countries were to reunite today, the new state would have nearly 400 million people, making it the third-largest country in the world after India and China. Such a union, however, could only work if built on federalism, democracy, and genuine respect for ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. Strong provincial autonomy would be essential to prevent the mistakes of the past.

Economically, the merger could create a powerful regional bloc. Bangladesh has developed one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, driven by its textile industry and manufacturing, while Pakistan holds advantages in agriculture, natural resources, and its strategic position along the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. Together, the two could balance industries, strengthen trade, and negotiate with global powers from a stronger position.

Socially and culturally, unity would demand acceptance of differences as a source of strength rather than division. The Bengali-speaking population once felt marginalized, and any renewed bond would only succeed if multilingualism and cultural variety were embraced wholeheartedly. Islamic traditions could provide common ground, but national identity would have to celebrate diversity, from Lahore’s Mughal heritage to Dhaka’s Bengali renaissance.

Geopolitically, a reunited Pakistan-Bangladesh would reshape South Asia. India would suddenly face a vast Muslim-majority state on both its western and eastern borders, a reality that could fuel tensions but also create opportunities for regional cooperation if approached wisely. Such a country could gain greater weight in global affairs, particularly in the Muslim world, and might even aspire to leadership within organizations like the OIC.

Yet the challenges to such a union are immense. The trauma of 1971 remains deeply embedded in Bangladesh’s national consciousness, where independence is seen as liberation rather than separation. Half a century of divergent political systems, foreign policies, and national identities has only widened the gap. For most Bangladeshis, rejoining Pakistan would feel like giving up hard-earned sovereignty.

In the end, the possibility of Pakistan and Bangladesh becoming one again is less a realistic future and more a thought experiment that forces reflection on the value of unity, diversity, and historical memory. Reunification may never happen, but cooperation in trade, culture, and diplomacy could create bonds nearly as strong as unity itself.