The BRI was first introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 during his visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. The concept presented was to build a transnational infrastructure network for boosting trade relations, which was later named the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. It was also known as the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, and today the initiative is widely referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative, in short BRI. In 2015, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with the Ministry of Commerce, issued an action plan for the BRI, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, with the aim of
promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources, and deep integration of markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to
achieve economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly creating an open, inclusive, and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all.
In recent years, China has evidently become a significant actor in the Arctic—a region located around the circumpolar north comprising territories of eight states and the Arctic
Ocean. In 2013, China’s achievement of observer status at the Arctic Council—the high-level intergovernmental forum of these eight circumpolar states—provided the country with legitimacy in its growing engagement with the Arctic region and its actors. A number of interests in the region motivate this engagement, most crucially that the Arctic is a
resource-rich region full of potential to further boost China’s local economy. The region
contains, among other resources, approximately one-fourth of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas resources. The increased melting of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean as a result of global warming is gradually opening access to water routes and the region itself.
The Arctic sea routes, in particular the Northern Sea Route (NSR), have already been identified as crucial navigation routes for China to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the Arctic. The expansion is now widely known as the Silk Road on the Ice or the Polar Silk Road, wherein China closely cooperates with Russia and other Arctic states to promote the infrastructural development to operationalise the NSR. China’s investments in a number of projects are making the country an influential actor in the Arctic region. As such, China’s Arctic engagement is at times perceived as an attempt to enhance its ambitions, not only in terms of its economic interests but also to move a step further towards gaining
great power status in world politics. While China firmly commits to respecting the sensitive environmental considerations existing in the Arctic and the sovereignty of the Arctic states,
also explicitly highlights its legitimate rights under international law, i.e., freedom of navigation through the Arctic sea routes.
In this context, the following article explores the extension of China’s Silk Road Economic
Belt to the Arctic vis-à-vis the possible geopolitical dynamics and whether China’s increasing engagement in the Arctic accelerates its political ambition to expand its great power status.
The Arctic Council—the high-level intergovernmental forum of these eight circumpolar states—provided the country with legitimacy in its growing engagement with the Arctic region and its actors. A number of interests in the region motivate this engagement, most crucially that the Arctic is a resource-rich region full of potential to further boost China’s
local economy. The region contains, among other resources, approximately one-fourth of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas resources. The increased melting of sea ice in the Arctic
Ocean as a result of globalChina gained credibility in its expanding interactions with the
Arctic region and its actors in 2013 when it was granted observer status at the Arctic Council, the high-level intergovernmental forum of these eight circumpolar states. This engagement is driven by a variety of regional interests, chief among them being the Arctic’s abundance of resources and potential to further strengthen China’s local economy. Among other resources, the area is home to over 25% of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves. The Arctic Ocean’s sea ice is melting more quickly due to global
Since the BRI project unifies China’s foreign aid and investment program and strengthens political and economic cooperation throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and even Latin
America, it has emerged as the “template for China’s foreign policy” 14 of our time. At the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation on May 14, 2017, which was attended by over 1,500 participants from over 130 countries, including 29 foreign heads of state and government leaders, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated this. 1 With the help of some 100 courtiers and international organizations, the program continues to advance as a successful project approved by the UN and other international organizations,
according to President Xi Jinping. According to President Xi, the InitiativeChina gained
credibility in its expanding interactions with the Arctic region and its actors in 2013 when it was granted observer status at the Arctic Council, the high-level intergovernmental forum of these eight circumpolar states. This engagement is driven by a variety of regional interests, chief among them being the Arctic’s abundance of resources and potential to further
strengthen China’s local economy. Among other resources, the area is home to over 25% of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves.
Since the BRI aims to maintain a multiplying impact by bolstering multilateral collaboration within its geographic reach, Xi Jinping is not a complete re-invention but rather a supplement to enhancing the current development policies of the participating nations. China has demonstrated its interest in enhancing multifaceted infrastructure connections in recent years by building, for instance, air, marine, and land transportation networks. The Initiative also reinforces existing infrastructure networks, including pipelines, ports, railroads, and the information highway.
As strongly stated in the joint communiqué issued during the two-day BRI Forum, the initiative advises BRI partners to remain dedicated to “win-win” cooperation and that China would not pursue any political goal.
An important geopolitical trend is China’s growing involvement in the Arctic, especially its attempts to expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) there. A mix of strategic and
commercial reasons, such as increased worldwide influence, new shipping lanes, and access to a wealth of natural resources, are behind this action.
Other Arctic countries and international powers are concerned about China’s increasing presence in the region, despite the country’s emphasis on environmental preservation and
adherence to international law. As nations compete for influence and control over resources, the region is at serious risk of geopolitical instability and strategic rivalry.
China’s influence in the Arctic will probably grow as the region continues to open up as a result of climate change.The future of the Arctic and its global ramifications will be greatly influenced by its capacity to strike a balance between its economic interests, environmental concerns, and international rules.